Regulating groundwater use in developing countries: a feasible instrument for public intervention
AbstractIn many developing countries, groundwater is a common pool resource which is potentially subject to the tragedy of the commons if water extraction is not adequately regulated. However, in these countries, the regulatory infrastructure is often too weak to allow detailed monitoring of individual groundwater extraction. For this reason, classical public intervention instruments, such as consumption fees or tradable quotas, are infeasible. Here we present a theoretical foundation for a new public regulatory instrument that can potentially generate the same efficiency inducing incentives as fees and tradable quotas, but without their information and monitoring requirements. The instrument we propose is a tax based on aggregate extraction, rather than individual extraction measures.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics in its series IFRO Working Paper with number 2011/3.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Developing countries; groundwater use; moral hazard problems; taxes;
Other versions of this item:
- Lars Gårn Hansen & Frank Jensen & Eirik S. Amundsen, 2014. "Regulating Groundwater Use in Developing Countries: A Feasible Instrument for Public Intervention," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(2), pages 317-335, June.
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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