Student Loans and the Allocation of Graduate Jobs
AbstractIn an economy where graduate jobs are allocated by tournament, and some of the potential participants cannot borrow against their expected future earnings, the government can increase efficiency and ex ante equity by redistributing wealth or, if that is not possible, by borrowing wholesale and lending to potential participants. Both policies replace some of the less able rich with some of the more able poor and bring education investments closer to their first-best levels.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis in its series Working Paper Series with number 38_13.
Date of creation: Jul 2013
Date of revision:
higher education; matching tournaments; credit;
Other versions of this item:
- Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, 2013. "Student loans and the allocation of graduate jobs," Working Papers - Economics wp2013_15.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
- Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, 2013. "Student loans and the allocation of graduate jobs," CHILD Working Papers Series 16, Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic Economics (CHILD) - CCA.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
- I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
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