Regulatory Compliance in Lake Victoria Fisheries
AbstractThis paper analyzes the causes for regulatory compliance using traditional deterrence variables and potential moral and social variables. We used self-reported data from Tanzanian artisanal fishers in Lake Victoria. The results indicated that the decision to be a non-violator or to be a violator—as well as the violation rate—are influenced by changes in deterrence variables (such as the probability of detection and punishment), but with respect to legitimacy and social variables. We also identified a small group of fishers that reacted neither to normative aspects nor to traditional deterrence variables, but persistently violated the regulation and used bribes to avoid punishment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Resources For the Future in its series Discussion Papers with number dp-08-14-efd.
Date of creation: 02 Jun 2008
Date of revision:
Compliance; fisheries; Lake Victoria; legitimacy; normative; deterrence;
Other versions of this item:
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
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