Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Independent inflation-targeting regime versus monetary union: An analysis of dynamic stability under endogenous inflation expectations

Contents:

Author Info

  • Dai, Meixing

Abstract

Some countries may face choice between targeting inflation independently and entering a monetary union that targets inflation. This paper shows that the choice of a country in favour of monetary union may be motivated by asymmetrical supply shocks. The demand shocks are neutralised under these regimes and don’t explain the choice of joining a monetary union. Further, before or after the construction of the union, monetary authorities must keep a minimum concern for stabilising output around its potential in order to guarantee the dynamic stability of the economy in a framework where the central bank is assumed to be unable to perfectly control, through the manipulation of the repo interest rate, the interest rate at which the private financial and non-financial agents lend and borrow. The disappearance of national currencies can render the economy of the union unstable.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15142/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 15142.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15142

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: inflation targeting; monetary union; optimal interest rate rule; asymmetrical supply shocks.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Canzoneri, Matthew B & Nolan, Charles & Yates, Tony, 1996. "Mechanisms for Achieving Monetary Stability: Inflation Targeting Versus the ERM," CEPR Discussion Papers 1418, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Rodseth, Asbjorn, 1996. " Exchange Rate versus Price Level Targets and Output Stability," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 98(4), pages 559-77, December.
  3. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1995. "Double-edged incentives: Institutions and policy coordination," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 1973-2030 Elsevier.
  4. Dai, Meixing & Sidiropoulos, Moïse, 2002. "Règle du taux d'intérêt optimale, prix des actions et taux d'inflation anticipé : une étude de la stabilité macroéconomique
    [Optimal interest rate rule, asset prices and expected inflation r
    ," MPRA Paper 14401, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2003.
  5. Øistein RØisland & Ragnar Torvik, 2003. "Optimum Currency Areas Under Inflation Targeting," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 99-118, April.
  6. Robert J. Gordon, 1997. "The Time-Varying NAIRU and Its Implications for Economic Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 11-32, Winter.
  7. Pierpaolo Benigno & David López-Salido, 2002. "Inflation persistence and optimal monetary policy in the euro area," International Finance Discussion Papers 749, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  8. Svensson, Lars E.O., 1998. "Open-Economy Inflation Targeting," Seminar Papers 638, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  9. Laurence M. Ball, 1999. "Policy Rules for Open Economies," NBER Chapters, in: Monetary Policy Rules, pages 127-156 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Michael Dueker & Andreas M. Fischer, 1995. "Inflation targeting in a small open economy: empirical results for Switzerland," Working Papers 1995-014, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  11. Andrew G. Haldane & Nicoletta Batini, 1998. "Forward-Looking Rules for Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 6543, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Frankel, Jeffrey, 1995. "The Stabilizing Properties of a Nominal GNP Rule," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(2), pages 318-34, May.
  13. Benigno, Pierpaolo, 2001. "Optimal Monetary Policy in a Currency Area," CEPR Discussion Papers 2755, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Berger, Helge & Jensen, Henrik & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2001. "To peg or not to peg?: A simple model of exchange rate regime choice in small economies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 161-167, November.
  15. Richard Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 2001. "Optimal Monetary Policy in Open versus Closed Economies: An Integrated Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 248-252, May.
  16. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15142. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.