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Intentional Vagueness

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Author Info
Oliver Board
Andreas Blume
Abstract

This paper analyzes communication with a language that is vague in the sense that identical messages do not always result in identical interpretations. It is shown that strategic agents frequently add to this vagueness by being intentionally vague, i.e. they deliberately choose less precise messages than they have to among the ones available to them in equilibrium. Having to communicate with a vague language can be welfare enhancing because it mitigates conflict. In equilibria that satisfy a dynamic stability condition intentional vagueness increases with the degree of conflict between sender and receiver.

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File URL: http://www.pitt.edu/~ojboard/papers/vagueness.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 365.

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Date of creation: Aug 2008
Date of revision: Aug 2008
Handle: RePEc:pit:wpaper:365

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

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  1. Andreas Blume & Oliver Board & Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Noisy Talk," ESE Discussion Papers 167, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Board, Oliver J. & Blume, Andreas & Kawamura, Kohei, 2007. "Noisy talk," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 2(4), pages 395-440, December. [Downloadable!]
  2. Petra M. Geraats, 2007. "The Mystique of Central Bank Speak," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 37-80, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-17.

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