Pragmatic Languages with Universal Grammars
AbstractThis paper shows the existence of an equilibrium pragmatic Language with a universal grammar as a coordination device under communication misunderstandings. Such a language plays a key role in achieving efficient outcomes in those Sender-Receiver games where there may exist noisy information transmission. The Language is pragmatic in the sense that the Receiver’ best response depends on the context, i.e, on the payoffs and on the initial probability distribution of the states of nature of the underlying game. The Language has a universal grammar because the coding rule does not depend on such specific parameters and can then be applied to any Sender-Receiver game with noisy communication.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Valencia, ERI-CES in its series Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour with number 0110.
Date of creation: Apr 2010
Date of revision:
grammar; pragmatic language; prototypes; separating equilibria;
Other versions of this item:
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J., 1995. "Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 370-405, August.
- A. Rubinstein, 1999.
"Economics and Language,"
Princeton Economic Theory Papers
00s6, Economics Department, Princeton University.
- Rubinstein,Ariel, 2000. "Economics and Language," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521593069, November.
- Rubinstein,Ariel, 2000. "Economics and Language," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521789905, November.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2000. "Economics and Language," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number lang1.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1996. "Why Are Certain Properties of Binary Relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 343-55, March.
- Andreas Blume & Oliver Board & Kohei Kawamura, 2007.
ESE Discussion Papers
167, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Stefano Demichelis & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2008.
"Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1292-1311, September.
- Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2007. "Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolution," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 61, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen Weibull, 2009. "Language, meaning and games A model of communication, coordination and evolution," Working Papers hal-00354224, HAL.
- Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2007. "Election by Majority Judgement: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers hal-00243076, HAL.
- Andreas Blume & Oliver Board, 2009.
381, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised May 2009.
- Frederic Koessler, 2000.
"Common Knowledge and Consensus with Noisy Communication,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0887, Econometric Society.
- Koessler, Frederic, 2001. "Common knowledge and consensus with noisy communication," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 139-159, September.
- Frédéric Koessler, 2000. "Common knowledge and consensus with noisy communication," Working Papers of BETA 2000-05, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010.
"Strategic Information Transmission,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
544, David K. Levine.
- Jacques Crémer & Luis Garicano & Andrea Prat, 2007.
"Language and the Theory of the Firm,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 122(1), pages 373-407, 02.
- Koessler, Frederic, 2004. "Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 292-320, August.
- Penélope Hernández & Bernhard von Stengel, 2012. "Nash Codes for Noisy Channels," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0912, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Emilio Calvo Ramón).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.