Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests
AbstractThis paper combines a literature overview of existing literature in game-theoretic pragmatics, with new models that fill some voids in the literature. We start with an overview of signaling games with a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, and show that the literature on such games can be classified into models with direct, costly, noisy and imprecise signals. We then argue that this same subdivision can be used to classify signaling games with common interests, where we fill some voids in the literature. For each of the signaling games treated, we show how equilibriumrefinement arguments and evolutionary arguments can be interpreted in the light of pragmatic inference.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Utrecht School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 11-25.
Date of creation: 2011
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-01-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-01-03 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2012-01-03 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-01-03 (Microeconomics)
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