Economic Laboratory Experiment on Horn's Rule
AbstractThis paper develops a framework for empirically testing several alternative game-theoretic rationales for Horn’s rule. It then presents an economic laboratory experiment where these rationales are empirically tested. Subjects seem to coordinate on Horn’s rule where efficiency acts as a focal point. Nevertheless, a weak interpretation of the evolutionary argument is not rejected: prior play does have an effect on future play. This suggests a hierarchy of effects, where the focal point effect dominates the evolutionary effect, with the latter being more pronounced in cheap talk situations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Utrecht School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 08-27.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-10-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2008-10-28 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2008-10-28 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2008-10-28 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2008-10-28 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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- Kris De Jaegher & Robert van Rooij, 2011. "Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests," Working Papers 11-25, Utrecht School of Economics.
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