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The Mystique of Central Bank Speak

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Author Info
Petra Geraats () (Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Cambridge)

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Abstract

Despite the recent trend towards greater transparency of monetary policy, in many respects mystique still prevails in central bank speak. This paper shows that the resulting perception of ambiguity could be desirable. Under the plausible assumption of imperfect common knowledge about the degree of central bank transparency, economic outcomes are affected by both the actual and perceived degree of transparency. It is shown that actual transparency is beneficial while it may be useful to create the perception of opacity. The optimal communication strategy for the central bank is to provide clarity about the inflation target and to communicate information about the output target and supply shocks with perceived ambiguity. In this respect, the central bank benefits from sustaining transparency misperceptions, which helps to explain the mystique of central bank speak.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank) in its series Working Papers with number 123.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 05 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:onb:oenbwp:123

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Related research
Keywords: Transparency monetary policy communication

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco & Schaling, Eric, 2000. "Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(2), pages 218-35, May.
    Other versions:
  3. Petra Geraats, 2005. "Transparency and Reputation: The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," Topics in Macroeconomics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1277-1277. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Jon Faust & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and credibility: monetary policy with unobservable goals," International Finance Discussion Papers 605, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Stein, Jeremy C, 1989. "Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 32-42, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Geraats, P.M., 2004. "Modelling Stochastic Relative Preferences," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0468, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  7. Goodfriend, Marvin, 1986. "Monetary mystique: Secrecy and central banking," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 63-92, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. S[empty]rensen, Jan Rose, 1991. "Political uncertainty and macroeconomic performance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 377-381, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December. [Downloadable!]
  11. Beetsma, Roel M W J & Jensen, Henrik, 2003. " Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique: Comment," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(1), pages 129-36, February.
  12. Jensen, Henrik, 2002. " Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 104(3), pages 399-422, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Petra M. Geraats, 2006. "Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice," CESifo Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(1), pages 111-152, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Petra Geraats, 2007. "Political Pressures and Monetary Mystique," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Oliver Board & Andreas Blume, 2008. "Intentional Vagueness," Working Papers 365, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]
  3. Cukierman, Alex, 2007. "The Limits of Transparency," CEPR Discussion Papers 6475, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Geraats, P.M, 2005. "Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0549, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Carin van der Cruijsen & Sylvester Eijffinger, 2008. "Actual versus Perceived Transparency: The Case of the European Central Bank," DNB Working Papers 163, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
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