Central Bank Transparency and Shocks
AbstractAccording to the literature, in an expectations-augmented Phillips curve model, opacity is always preferred to transparency on central bank forecasts. By modelling the private sector's behavior explicitly, we show that transparency reduces the shocks. Consequently, transparency can be preferred.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00560261.
Date of creation: May 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, Economics Letters, 2010, 107, 2, 158-160
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central bank; transparency; Phillips curve; shocks.;
Other versions of this item:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2011-02-05 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2011-02-05 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2011-02-05 (Monetary Economics)
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