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Learning Efficient Nash Equilibria in Distributed Systems

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  • H Peyton Young
  • Bary S. R. Pradelski
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    Abstract

    An individual's learning rule is completely uncoupled if it does not depend on the actions or payoffs of anyone else.� We propose a variant of log linear learning that is completely uncoupled and that selects an efficient pure Nash equilibrium in all generic n-person games that possess at least one pure Nash equilibrium.� In games that do not have such an equilibrium, there is a simple formula that expresses the long-run probability of the various disequilibrium states in terms of two factors: i) the sum of payoffs over all agents, and ii) the maximum payoff gain that results from a unilateral deviation by some agent.� This welfare/stability trade-off criterion provides a novel framework for analyzing the selection of disequilibrium as well as equilibrium states in n-person games.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 480.

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    Date of creation: 01 Feb 2010
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    Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:480

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