This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Learning by trial and error

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Young, H. Peyton

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

A person learns by trial and error if he occasionally tries out new strategies, rejecting choices that are erroneous in the sense that they do not lead to higher payoffs. In a game, however, strategies can become erroneous due to a change of behavior by someone else. We introduce a learning rule in which behavior is conditional on whether a player experiences an error of the first or second type. This rule, called interactive trial and error learning, implements Nash equilibrium behavior in any game with generic payoffs and at least one pure Nash equilibrium.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-4S3WX0H-1/2/f05c0e1f73abb5df86d28e83d7733751
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 65 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 626-643
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:2:p:626-643

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords: Learning Adaptive dynamics Nash equilibrium Bounded rationality;

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Mónica C. Capra, 2004. "Mood-Driven Behavior in Strategic Interactions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 367-372, May. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 2006. "Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 286-303, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Yakov Babichenko, 2007. "Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series dp459, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  4. Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 2003. "Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 73-96, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Germano, Fabrizio & Lugosi, Gabor, 2007. "Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 135-154, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Karandikar, Rajeeva & Mookherjee, Dilip & Ray, Debraj & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 1998. "Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 292-331, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 2006. "Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(3), pages 341-367, September. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 2001. "A General Class of Adaptive Strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 26-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Yakov Babichenko, 2007. "Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000369, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Kirchsteiger, G. & Rigotti, L. & Rustichini, A., 2000. "Your morals are your moods," Discussion Paper 122, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Jehiel, Philippe, 1998. "Learning to Play Limited Forecast Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 274-298, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Smith, Kip & Dickhaut, John, 2005. "Economics and emotion: Institutions matter," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 316-335, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2003. "Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1830-1836, December. [Downloadable!]
  15. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2000. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1127-1150, September.
    Other versions:
  16. Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh, 1999. "Regret in the On-Line Decision Problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 7-35, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can use IDEAS to provide links to papers and articles in your course syllabus.

This page was last updated on 2010-1-18.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.