Carbon leakage is a major concern for policymakers involved with environmental initiatives such as the European Union’s emissions trading scheme and similar cap-and-trade proposals in the United States, Australia, and elsewhere. This paper provides a framework for understanding the drives underlying carbon leakage at the level of an individual sector in which only a subset of firms is covered by such regulation. It provides simple formulae to estimate leakage rates using information on industry characteristics that is typically available to the analyst. Illustrative estimates for the steel industry in the EU ETS suggest carbon leakage of 25-30% or (much) higher - unless environmental-efficiency improvements by regulated firms are substantial.
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Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number
461.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984.
"Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly,"
Discussion Papers
642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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