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From "Clientelism" to a "Client-Centred Orientation"? The Challenge of Public Administration Reform in Russia

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  • William Tompson

Abstract

The inefficiency, corruption and lack of accountability that afflict public administration in Russia impose substantial direct costs on both entrepreneurs and ordinary citizens. This paper examines the major weaknesses of Russia’s public administration and assesses the government’s recently revised programme of administrative reform. It lays particular stress on the relationship between public bureaucracies and the larger institutional environment within which they operate, as well as on the need for far greater transparency of public bodies and stronger non-judicial means of redress for citizens wishing to challenge bureaucratic decisions. Many of the problems of Russia’s public administration are aggravated by the fact that the Russian state often tries to do too much: the paper therefore explores the link between administrative reform and the scope of state ownership and regulation. Du « clientélisme » à une culture administrative orientée vers le « client »? Le défi de la réforme de l'administration publique en Russie Le manque d’efficacité, la corruption et la déresponsabilisation de l’administration publique en Russie imposent un lourd fardeau à la fois aux entreprises et aux particuliers. Cette étude examine les principales faiblesses de l’administration publique russe et évalue le programme gouvernemental de réforme administrative, récemment révisé. Un accent particulier est mis sur les liens entre l’administration publique et l’environnement institutionnel dans lequel elle opère ainsi que sur la nécessité d’une bien plus grande transparence des organes publics et de voies de recours extrajudiciaires renforcées pour les citoyens contestant une décision administrative. Beaucoup des problèmes de l’administration publique russe sont aggravés par le fait que, souvent, l’État russe est enclin à trop intervenir ; pour cette raison, l’étude analyse les interactions entre la réforme administrative d’une part et l’étendue de la propriété publique et de la réglementation d’autre part.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/332450142780
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by OECD Publishing in its series OECD Economics Department Working Papers with number 536.

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Date of creation: 15 Jan 2007
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Handle: RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:536-en

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Keywords: corruption; public management; transparency; regulation; state ownership; bureaucracy; civil service; state administration; ombudsman; public administration; accountability; nationalisation; responsabilité; médiateur; transparence; régulation; bureaucratie; fonction publique; administration de l’Etat; nationalisation; entreprise d'État; corruption; administration publique; gestion publique;

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  1. Isabelle Joumard & Per Mathis Kongsrud & Young-Sook Nam & Robert Price, 2003. "Enhancing the Cost Effectiveness of Public Spending: Experience in OECD Countries," OECD Economic Studies, OECD Publishing, OECD Publishing, vol. 2003(2), pages 109-161.
  2. Georgy Egorov & Sergei Guriev & Konstantin Sonin, 2006. "Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse," CEDI Discussion Paper Series, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University 06-10, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
  3. Brunetti, Aymo & Weder, Beatrice, 2003. "A free press is bad news for corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1801-1824, August.
  4. Phyllis Dininio & Robert W. Orttung, 2004. "Explaining Patterns of Corruption in the Russian Regions," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 727, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
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