Can International Migration Ever Be Made a Pareto Improvement?
AbstractWe argue that compensating losers is more difficult for immigration than for trade and capital movements. While a tax-cum-subsidy mechanism allows the government to turn the gains from trade into a Pareto improvement, the same is not true for the so-called immigration surplus, if the redistributive mechanism is not allowed to discriminate against migrants. We discuss policy conclusions to be drawn from this fundamental asymmetry between migration and other forms of globalization.
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Migration Surplus; Redistribution; Pareto Improvement;
Other versions of this item:
- Gabriel J Felbermayr & Wilhelm Kohler, 2009. "Can International Migration Ever Be Made a Pareto Improvement?," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut fÃ¼r Volkswirtschaftslehre der UniversitÃ¤t Hohenheim 305/2009, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
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