Freeman (2006) suggested that auctioning immigration visas and redistributing the revenue to native residents in the host country would increase migration from low-income to high-income countries. The effect of the auctioning of immigration visas, in the Ricardian model from Findlay (1982), on the optimal level of immigration for the host country is considered. It is shown that auctioning immigration visas will lead to a positive level of immigration only if the initial wage difference between the host country and the source country is substantial. The cost of the immigration visa is more than half the earnings of the immigrant worker.
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Paper provided by Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section in its series Cardiff Economics Working Papers with number
E2007/25.
Length: 15 pages Date of creation: Aug 2007 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in Review of Development Economics, Vol. 13, 2009, pp. 687-694. Handle: RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2007/25
Find related papers by JEL classification: F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
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