Effort levels in contests: an empirical application of the Tullock model
AbstractEmpirical applications of the Tullock contest model are rare, due in part to the non-observability of effort. This paper presents an application of the standard Tullock model in a setting where effort can be observed and explained. A simple contest model is used to predict levels of effort in English soccer, with data on fouls and yellow and red cards used to reflect the effort of teams. Effort levels are found to be higher in matches between evenly balanced teams, and in matches with implications for end-of-season outcomes. The results suggest that the teams’ effort levels are strategic complements.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham Business School, Economics Division in its series Working Papers with number 2008/9.
Date of creation: Jul 2008
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Tullock contest; team sport; strategic complements.;
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- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
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