Who Has a Better Idea? Innovation, Shared Capitalism, and HR Policies
AbstractWe investigate the relationship of "shared capitalist" compensation systems - profit/gainsharing, employee ownership, and stock options - to the culture for innovation and employees' ability and willingness to engage in innovative activity. Using a large dataset with over 25,000 employee surveys in over 200 worksites of a large multinational organization, we find that both shared capitalism compensation and high performance work policies contribute to these innovation outcomes. Owning company stock is the most consistently positive compensation variable in predicting both an innovation culture and willingness to engage in innovative activity. We also find that shared capitalism and high performance work policies have stronger effects in predicting an innovation culture when they are combined, and that the effects of shared capitalism and high performance work policies are partially, but not wholly, mediated through greater employee alignment with company strategy. The findings are consistent with agency theories predicting that the principal agent problem can be addressed by a combination of shared incentives and cooperative culture which encourages mutual monitoring and opportunities to share information.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 14234.
Date of creation: Aug 2008
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J54 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
- L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-08-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-INO-2008-08-21 (Innovation)
- NEP-KNM-2008-08-21 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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