Motivating Employee-Owners in ESOP Firms: Human Resource Policies and Company Performance
AbstractWhat enables some employee ownership firms to overcome the free rider problem and motivate employees to improve performance? This study analyzes the role of human resource policies in the performance of employee ownership companies, using employee survey data from 14 companies and a national sample of employee-owners. Between-firm comparisons of 11 ESOP firms show that an index of human resource policies, nominally controlled by management, is positively related to employee reports of co-worker performance and other good workplace outcomes (including perceptions of fairness, good supervision, and worker input and influence). Within-firm comparisons in three ESOP firms, and exploratory results from a national survey, show that employee-owners who participate in employee involvement committees are more likely to exert peer pressure on shirking co-workers. We conclude that an understanding of how and when employee ownership works successfully requires a three-pronged analysis of: 1) the incentives that ownership gives; 2) the participative mechanisms available to workers to act on those incentives; and 3) the corporate culture that battles against tendencies to free ride.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10177.
Date of creation: Dec 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Perotin, Virginie (ed.) Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Self- managed Firms. New York: Elsevier Science Ltd, 2004.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Douglas Kruse & Joseph Blasi & Robert Buchele & Adria Scharf & Loren Rodgers & Chris Mackin & Richard B. Freeman, 2004. "Motivating employee owners in ESOP firms: human resource policies and company performance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 19930, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Joseph Blasi & Robert Buchele & Richard Freeman & Douglas Kruse & Chris Mackin & Loren Rodgers & Adria Scharf, 2004. "Motivating Employee Owners in ESOP Firms: Human Resource Policies and Company Performance," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE dp0658, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- J54 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Craig, Ben & Pencavel, John, 1992. "The Behavior of Worker Cooperatives: The Plywood Companies of the Pacific Northwest," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1083-105, December.
- Martin J. Conyon & Richard B. Freeman, 2001.
"Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm Performance: UK Evidence,"
NBER Working Papers
8448, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Martin Conyon & Richard B. Freeman, 2004. "Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm Performance U.K. Evidence," NBER Chapters, in: Seeking a Premier Economy: The Economic Effects of British Economic Reforms, 1980-2000, pages 109-146 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Martin J. Conyon & Richard B. Freeman, 2002. "Shared modes of compensation and firm performance: UK evidence," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 20060, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Martin J. Conyon & Richard Freeman, 2002. "Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm Performance: UK Evidence," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE dp0560, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Douglas L. Kruse, 1993. "Profit Sharing: Does It Make a Difference?," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number ps.
- Erika Harden & Douglas L. Kruse & Joseph R. Blasi, 2008. "Who Has a Better Idea? Innovation, Shared Capitalism, and HR Policies," NBER Working Papers 14234, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fabling, Richard & Grimes, Arthur, 2007. "HR Practices and Firm Performance: What Matters and Who Does It?," Occasional Papers 07/2, Ministry of Economic Development, New Zealand.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.