Pierre-Richard Agénor Koray Alper Luiz Pereira da Silva
Abstract
The business cycle effects of bank capital regulatory regimes are examined in a New Keynesian model with credit market imperfections and a cost channel of monetary policy. A key feature of the model is that bank capital increases incentives for banks to monitor borrowers, thereby reducing the probability of default. Basel I- and Basel II-type regulatory regimes are defined, and the model is calibrated for a middle-income country. Numerical simulations show that, depending on the elasticities that relate the repayment probability to its micro and macro determinants, and the elasticity of the risk weight (under Basel II) with respect to the repayment probability, Basel I may be more procyclical than Basel II in response to adverse supply and demand shocks.
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Charles A.E. Goodhart & Pojanart Sunirand & Dimitrios P. Tsomocos, 2005.
"A risk assessment model for banks,"
Annals of Finance,
Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 197-224, 09.
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