Credit Market Competition and Capital Regulation
AbstractEmpirical evidence suggests that banks hold capital in excess of regulatory minimums. This did not prevent the financial crisis and underlines the importance of understanding bank capital determination. Market discipline is one of the forces that induces banks to hold positive capital. The literature has focused on the liability side. We develop a simple theory based on monitoring to show that discipline from the asset side can also be important. In perfectly competitive markets, banks can find it optimal to use costly capital rather than the interest rate on the loan to commit to monitoring because it allows higher borrower surplus. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: firstname.lastname@example.org, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Society for Financial Studies in its journal Review of Financial Studies.
Volume (Year): 24 ()
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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- Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti & Robert Marquez, 2009. "Credit Market Competition and Capital Regulation," Economics Working Papers ECO2009/08, European University Institute.
- Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti & Robert Marquez, 2006. "Credit market competition and capital regulation," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2006-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena & Marquez, Robert, 2005. "Credit market competition and capital regulation," CFS Working Paper Series 2005/23, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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