Monopoly Pricing of an Antibiotic Subject to Bacterial Resistance
AbstractWe develop a dynamic bio-economic model of bacterial resistance and disease transmission in which we characterize the pricing policy of a monopolist who is protected by a patent. After expiration, the monopolist behaves competitively in a generic industry having open access to the common pool of antibiotic efficacy and infection. The monopolist manages endogenously the levels of antibiotic efficacy as well as the infected population, which represent quality and market size respectively and achieves, at least temporarily, higher such levels than a hypothetically myopic monopolist who does not take into account the dynamic externalities. The pricing policy and the biological system are characterized by the turnpike property. Before the patent vanishes, the monopolist behaves more and more myopically, leading to a continuous decrease in the price of the antibiotic. Once the generic industry takes over, a discontinuous fall in price occurs. Whether a prolongation of the patent is socially desirable depends on the relative levels of antibiotic efficacy and infection.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CIRPEE in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 0946.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Antibiotic efficacy; public health; monopoly pricing; renewable resource; optimal control; turnpike; patent length;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- Q21 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-11-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2009-11-07 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2009-11-07 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2009-11-07 (Intellectual Property Rights)
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