This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Market structure and communicable diseases

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Stéphane Mechoulan

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Communicable diseases pose a formidable challenge for public policy. Using numerical simulations, we show under which scenarios a monopolist's price and prevalence paths converge to a non-zero steady state. In contrast, a planner typically eradicates the disease. If eradication is impossible, the planner subsidizes treatments as long as the prevalence can be controlled. Drug resistance exacerbates the welfare difference between monopoly and first best outcomes. Nevertheless, because the negative externalities from resistance compete with the positive externalities of treatment, a mixed competition/monopoly regime may perform better than competition alone. This result has important implications for the design of many drug patents.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://economics.ca/cgi/xms?jab=v40n2/CJEv40n2p0468.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: Available to subscribers only. Alternative access through JSTOR and Ingenta.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 40 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 468-492
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:40:y:2007:i:2:p:468-492

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office CIREQ-C.R.D.E., Université de Montréal C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-ville Montréal, Québec, H3C 3J7, Canada
Email:
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://economics.ca/en/membership.php

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Kessing, Sebastian G. & Nuscheler, Robert, 2006. "Monopoly pricing with negative network effects: The case of vaccines," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 1061-1069, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Brito, Dagobert L. & Sheshinski, Eytan & Intriligator, Michael D., 1991. "Externalities and compulsary vaccinations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 69-90, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Steven Goldman & James Lightwood, 2002. "Cost Optimization in the SIS Model of Infectious Disease with Treatment," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1007-1007. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Stephen P. A. Brown & William C. Gruben, 1997. "Intellectual property rights and product effectiveness," Economic and Financial Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, issue Q IV, pages 15-20. [Downloadable!]
  5. John B. Horowitz & H. Brian Moehring, 2004. "How property rights and patents affect antibiotic resistance," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(6), pages 575-583. [Downloadable!]
  6. Alistair Munro, 1997. "Economics and biological evolution," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 9(4), pages 429-449, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Mark Gersovitz & Jeffrey S. Hammer, 2004. "The Economical Control of Infectious Diseases," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(492), pages 1-27, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Michael Hoel & Scott Barrett, 2004. "Optimal Disease Eradication," Working Papers 2004.50, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  9. Tomas Philipson, 1999. "Economic Epidemiology and Infectious Diseases," NBER Working Papers 7037, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Scott Barrett, 2003. "Global Disease Eradication," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 591-600, 04/05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Francis, Peter J., 1997. "Dynamic epidemiology and the market for vaccinations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 383-406, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Geoffard, Pierre-Yves & Philipson, Tomas, 1997. "Disease Eradication: Private versus Public Vaccination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 222-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Use the JEL tree to browse through the database by subfields.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-19.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.