Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Wage Generosity

Contents:

Author Info

  • Schlicht, Ekkehart

Abstract

Actual wages typically exceed collectively set standard wages. Standard wages are, therefore, not binding, yet they seem to influence actual wages strongly. An explanation for this phenomenon is offered along the lines of the Fair Wage/Effort Hypothesis proposed by G. Akerlof and J. Yellen (1990). It is argued that it is precisely when collectively set wages are relatively unimportant for perceptions of fairness at the firm level, that large wage mark-ups emerge. The general point seems to be that the results of economic modeling may react very sensitively to the customary suppression of "non-economic" factors.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3165/2/_R_Schlicht_wage_generosity.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Munich Reprints in Economics with number 3165.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 3 148(1992): pp. 437-451
Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:3165

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Ludwigstr. 28, 80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-3405
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3510
Web page: http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Wage setting; fair wage; collective bargaining; efficiency wage; wage drift;

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Jonathan S. Leonard, 1987. "Carrots and Sticks: Pay, Supervision and Turnover," NBER Working Papers 2176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Akerlof, George A, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-69, November.
  3. Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-80, June.
  4. Salop, Steven C, 1979. "A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 117-25, March.
  5. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1978. "Labour Turnover, Wage Structure, and Natural Unemployment," Munich Reprints in Economics 1255, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  6. Weiss, Andrew W, 1980. "Job Queues and Layoffs in Labor Markets with Flexible Wages," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 526-38, June.
  7. Yellen, Janet L, 1984. "Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 200-205, May.
  8. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1987. "The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 1-48, March.
  9. Frank, Robert H, 1984. "Are Workers Paid Their Marginal Products?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 549-71, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Dinardo, John & Hallock, Kevin F & Pischke, Jörn-Steffen, 2000. "Unions And The Labour Market For Managers," CEPR Discussion Papers 2418, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Max Albert & Jürgen Meckl, 2001. "Green Tax Reform and Two-Component Unemployment: Double Dividend or Double Loss?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(2), pages 265-, June.
  3. Frank Scharr, 2006. "Tarifbindung, Rententeilung und Konzessionsverträge als Einflussgrößen der Lohnhöhe in thüringischen Unternehmen," ifo Dresden berichtet, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 13(04), pages 17-23, 08.
  4. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 2006. "Arbeitsmarkt und Beschäftigung," Discussion Papers in Economics 959, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  5. Frank Scharr, 2005. "Tarifbindung, Rententeilung und Konzessionsverträge als Einflussgrößen der Lohnhöhe in Unternehmen : eine Untersuchung mit Mikrodaten für thüringische Firmen," ifo Dresden Studien, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 39.
  6. Pull, Kerstin, 1999. "What is the fair wage? A model of as-if-co-operation," Quint-Essenzen 58, Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Community (IAAEG), University of Trier.
  7. Meckl, Jurgen, 2004. "Accumulation of technological knowledge, wage differentials, and unemployment," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 65-82, March.
  8. Ariane Breitfelder & Udo Broll & Kit Pong Wong, 2008. "Wages, Employment and Futures Markets," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 21(2), pages 118-123, Autumn.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:3165. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alexandra Frank).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.