This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Carrots and Sticks: Pay, Supervision and Turnover

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Jonathan S. Leonard

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Large and persistent differences across industries in wages paid for given occupations have commonly been observed. Recently, the efficiency wage model (EWM) has been advanced as an explanation for these wage differentials. The shirking version of the EWM assumes a trade-off between self-supervision and external supervision. The turnover version assumes turnover is costly to the firm. Variation across firms in the cost of monitoring/shirking or turnover then are hypothesized to account for wage variation across firms for homogeneous workers. This paper presents empirical evidence of the trade-off of wage premiums for supervisory intensity and turnover. A new sample of 200 firms in one sector in one state in 1982 is analyzed. Little evidence is found to support either version of EWM. The substantial variation in wages for narrowly defined occupations across firms remains largely unexplained.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w2176.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 2176.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Feb 1987
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2176

Note: LS
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Charles Brown & James L. Medoff, 1989. "The Employer Size-Wage Effect," NBER Working Papers 2870, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Katharine G. Abraham & Henry S. Farber, 1986. "Job Duration, Seniority and Earnings," Working papers 407, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. David Levine, 1991. "You Get What You Pay For: Tests of Efficency Wage Theories in the United States and Japan," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series 1054, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
  2. Derek Neal & Sherwin Rosen, 1998. "Theories of the Distribution of Labor Earnings," NBER Working Papers 6378, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dennis Dittrich & Martin G. Kocher, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-098/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Harry J. Holzer, 1990. "Wages, Employer Costs, and Employee Performance in the Firm," NBER Working Papers 2830, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Andrea Ichino & Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "Work Environment and Individual Background: Explaining Regional Shirking Differentials in a Large Italian Firm," NBER Working Papers 7415, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Fali Huang & Peter Cappelli, 2006. "Employee Screening: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 12071, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Lundborg, Per, 2005. "Individual Wage Setting, Efficiency Wages and Productivity in Sweden," Working Paper Series 205, Trade Union Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Alan B. Krueger, 1990. "Ownership, Agency and Wages: An Examination in the Fast Food Industry," NBER Working Papers 3334, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Andreas P. Georgiadis, 2006. "Is there a Wage-Supervision Trade-Off? Efficiency Wages Evidence From the 1990 British Workplace Industrial Relations Survey," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 06/152, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
  10. Joseph A. Ritter & Lowell J. Taylor, 1997. "Economic models of employee motivation," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Sep, pages 3-21. [Downloadable!]
  11. Robert A. J. Dur & Amihai Glazer, 2005. "The Desire for Impact," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. William T. Dickens & Lawrence F. Katz, 1987. "Inter-Industry Wage Differences and Theories of Wage Determination," NBER Working Papers 2271, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Canice Prendergast, 1996. "What Happens Within Firms? A Survey of Empirical Evidence on Compensation Policies," NBER Working Papers 5802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Seref Saygili, 1998. "Is the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis Valid for Developing Countries? Evidence from the Turkish Cement Industry," Studies in Economics 9810, Department of Economics, University of Kent. [Downloadable!]
  15. David Levine, 1989. "Cohesiveness, Productivity, and Wage Dispersion," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series 1042, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Dittrich, Dennis & Kocher, Martin, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee under Endogenous Supervision," CEPR Discussion Papers 5962, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Bradley Ewing & Phanindra Wunnava, 2002. "The Trade-Off Between Supervision Cost and Performance-Based Pay: Does it Matter?," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0232, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Sarah Brown & Fathi Fakhfakh & John G. Sessions, . "Wages, Supervision and Sharing," Discussion Papers in Public Sector Economics 00/4, Department of Economics, University of Leicester. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Nikolaos Theodoropoulos & John G. Sessions, 2009. "Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 5-2009, University of Cyprus Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  20. Bradley Ewing & Phanindra Wunnava, 2004. "The Trade-Off Between Supervision Cost and Performance Based Pay: Does Gender Matter?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 23(5), pages 453-460, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Joseph A. Ritter & Lowell J. Taylor, 1997. "Economic models of employee motivation," Working Papers 1997-006, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
  22. Erica L. Groshen, 1988. "Why do wages vary among employers?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q I, pages 19-38. [Downloadable!]
  23. Garcia-Prado, Ariadna, 2005. "Sweetening the carrot : motivating public physicians for better performance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3772, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc and its associated services are free for contributors and users, and do not accept any advertising.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.