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Carrots and Sticks: Pay, Supervision, and Turnover

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Author Info
Leonard, Jonathan S

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Abstract

The efficiency wage model (EWM) has been advanced as an explanation for large and persistent wage differentials. The shirking version of the EWM assumes a trade-off b etween self-supervision and external supervision. The turnover versio n assumes turnover is costly to the firm. Variation across firms in t he cost of monitoring/shirking or turnover then is hypothesized to ac count for wage variations across firms for homogeneous workers. Using a new sample of firm data, this paper presents empirical evidence of the trade-off of wage premiums for supervisory intensity and turnove r. Little evidence is found to support either version of the EWM. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.

Volume (Year): 5 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: S136-52
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:5:y:1987:i:4:p:s136-52

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Charles Brown & James L. Medoff, 1989. "The Employer Size-Wage Effect," NBER Working Papers 2870, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Katharine G. Abraham & Henry S. Farber, 1986. "Job Duration, Seniority and Earnings," Working papers 407, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Joseph A. Ritter & Lowell J. Taylor, 1997. "Economic models of employee motivation," Working Papers 1997-006, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
  2. David Levine, 1991. "You Get What You Pay For: Tests of Efficency Wage Theories in the United States and Japan," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series 1054, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
  3. Dennis Dittrich & Martin Kocher, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-23, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. William T. Dickens & Lawrence F. Katz, 1987. "Inter-Industry Wage Differences and Theories of Wage Determination," NBER Working Papers 2271, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Derek Neal & Sherwin Rosen, 1998. "Theories of the Distribution of Labor Earnings," NBER Working Papers 6378, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Canice Prendergast, 1996. "What Happens Within Firms? A Survey of Empirical Evidence on Compensation Policies," NBER Working Papers 5802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Sarah Brown & Fathi Fakhfakh & John G. Sessions, . "Wages, Supervision and Sharing," Discussion Papers in Public Sector Economics 00/4, Department of Economics, University of Leicester. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Harry J. Holzer, 1990. "Wages, Employer Costs, and Employee Performance in the Firm," NBER Working Papers 2830, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Erica L. Groshen, 1988. "Why do wages vary among employers?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q I, pages 19-38. [Downloadable!]
  10. Seref Saygili, 1998. "Is the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis Valid for Developing Countries? Evidence from the Turkish Cement Industry," Studies in Economics 9810, Department of Economics, University of Kent. [Downloadable!]
  11. Nikolaos Theodoropoulos & John G. Sessions, 2009. "Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 5-2009, University of Cyprus Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Andrea Ichino & Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "Work Environment and Individual Background: Explaining Regional Shirking Differentials in a Large Italian Firm," NBER Working Papers 7415, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Huang Fali & Peter Cappelli, 2006. "Employee Screening: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 11-2006, Singapore Management University, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Lundborg, Per, 2005. "Individual Wage Setting, Efficiency Wages and Productivity in Sweden," Working Paper Series 205, Trade Union Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  15. Alan B. Krueger, 1990. "Ownership, Agency and Wages: An Examination in the Fast Food Industry," NBER Working Papers 3334, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Andreas P. Georgiadis, 2006. "Is there a Wage-Supervision Trade-Off? Efficiency Wages Evidence From the 1990 British Workplace Industrial Relations Survey," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 06/152, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
  17. David Levine, 1989. "Cohesiveness, Productivity, and Wage Dispersion," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series 1042, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Bradley Ewing & Phanindra Wunnava, 2004. "The Trade-Off Between Supervision Cost and Performance Based Pay: Does Gender Matter?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 23(5), pages 453-460, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Joseph A. Ritter & Lowell J. Taylor, 1997. "Economic models of employee motivation," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Sep, pages 3-21. [Downloadable!]
  20. Garcia-Prado, Ariadna, 2005. "Sweetening the carrot : motivating public physicians for better performance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3772, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  21. Robert A. J. Dur & Amihai Glazer, 2005. "The Desire for Impact," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  22. Dittrich, Dennis & Kocher, Martin, 2006. "Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee under Endogenous Supervision," CEPR Discussion Papers 5962, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Bradley Ewing & Phanindra Wunnava, 2002. "The Trade-Off Between Supervision Cost and Performance-Based Pay: Does it Matter?," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0232, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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