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Labor Market Signaling with Overconfident Workers N.B.: This paper is replaced by Nr 11.07 "Labor Market Signaling and Self-Confidence: Wage Compression and the Gender Pay Gap" (December 2011)

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  • Luis Santos-Pinto

Abstract

I extend Spence's (1974) labor market signaling model by assuming some workers are overconfident and some underconfident. Overconfident (underconfident) workers underestimate (overestimate) their marginal cost of acquiring education. Firms cannot observe workers' productive abilities and cannot observe workers' beliefs. However, firms know the fraction of overconfident, underconfident, and high-ability workers in the economy. I find that the presence of overconfident and/or underconfident workers in the labor market compresses wages. I show that workers' biased beliefs reduce welfare when workers are sufficiently different in terms of productivity and cost of education. Finally, I show that if the fraction of overconfident workers is relatively low and workers are sufficiently similar in terms of productivity and cost of education, then biased beliefs improve welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Luis Santos-Pinto, 2010. "Labor Market Signaling with Overconfident Workers N.B.: This paper is replaced by Nr 11.07 "Labor Market Signaling and Self-Confidence: Wage Compression and the Gender Pay Gap" (December 201," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 10.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    • Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:10.07
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    File URL: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/textes/10.07.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Michael Spence, 2002. "Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 434-459, June.
    5. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, 2018. "Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia and information suppression in competitive markets," Chapters, in: Victor J. Tremblay & Elizabeth Schroeder & Carol Horton Tremblay (ed.), Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization, chapter 3, pages 40-74, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Carl M. Campbell III & Kunal S. Kamlani, 1997. "The Reasons for Wage Rigidity: Evidence from a Survey of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(3), pages 759-789.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    signaling; labor market; behavioral biases; wages; education;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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