This paper examines a competitive model of add-on pricing, the practice of advertising low prices for one good in hopes of selling additional products (or a higher quality product) to consumers at a high price at the point of sale. The main conclusion is that add-on pricing softens price competition between firms and results in higher equilibrium profits.
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number
9721.
Length: Date of creation: May 2003 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9721
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Find related papers by JEL classification: L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets M30 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising - - - General
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Justin P. Johnson Author-Email: jpj25@cornell.edu Author-Workplace-Name: Cornell University & David P. Myatt, 2006.
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Other versions:
Young Han Lee & Ulrike Malmendier, 2007.
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NBER Working Papers
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)