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Selling to Overconfident Consumers

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  • Michael D. Grubb

    ()
    (Stanford University)

Abstract

Consumers may overestimate the precision of their demand forecasts. This overconfidence creates an incentive for both monopolists and competitive firms to offer tariffs with included quantities at zero marginal cost, followed by steep marginal charges. This matches observed cellphone service pricing plans in the US and elsewhere. An alternative explanation with common priors can be ruled out in favor of overconfidence based on observed customer usage patterns for a major US cellular phone service provider. The model can be reinterpreted to explain the use of flat rates and late fees in rental markets, and teaser rates on loans. Nevertheless, firms may benefit from consumers losing their overconfidence.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research in its series Discussion Papers with number 06-018.

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Date of creation: Nov 2006
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Handle: RePEc:sip:dpaper:06-018

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Keywords: overconfident consumers; cellphone plans; rental markets; teaser rates;

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