The Signalling Role of Promotion in Japan
AbstractUnder asymmetric information conditions regarding worker productivity between current and prospective employers, a worker's promotion signals his/her productivity. In this Paper, we tested the signalling role of promotion, using Japanese micro-level data. We found that among lower-level positions, promotion seems to signal a worker's ability, and both the business cycle and foreign-capital ratio of his/her company significantly strengthen this effects. These results suggest that external labour market conditions (i.e. asymmetric information regarding a worker's abilities between a current and prospective employer) affect the economic differences among workers in the internal labour market.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University in its series Discussion Papers with number 1112.
Date of creation: Aug 2011
Date of revision:
Strategically delayed promotion; Signalling; Wage growth; Japan.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Longitudinal Data; Spatial Time Series
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-08-22 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2011-08-22 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2011-08-22 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2011-08-22 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LMA-2011-08-22 (Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, & Wages)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bas Klaauw & António Dias da Silva, 2011.
"Wage dynamics and promotions inside and between firms,"
Journal of Population Economics,
Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 1513-1548, October.
- Antonio Dias da Silva & Bas van der Klaauw, 2006. "Wage Dynamics and Promotions inside and between Firms," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-084/3, Tinbergen Institute.
- Silva, António Dias da & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2006. "Wage Dynamics and Promotions Inside and Between Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 2351, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Ishida, Junichiro, 2004. "Signaling and strategically delayed promotion," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 687-700, December.
- Gibbons, Robert & Katz, Lawrence F., 1991.
"Layoffs and Lemons,"
3442782, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Gibbons, R. & Katz, L.F., 1989. "Layoffs And Lemons," Working papers 531, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Robert Gibbons & Lawrence Katz, 1989. "Layoffs and Lemons," Working Papers 629, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Robert Gibbons & Lawrence Katz, 1991. "Layoffs and Lemons," NBER Working Papers 2968, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Farber, Henry S & Gibbons, Robert, 1996.
"Learning and Wage Dynamics,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 111(4), pages 1007-47, November.
- Ariga,Kenn & Brunello,Giorgio & Ohkusa,Yasushi, 2000.
"Internal Labour Markets in Japan,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521642408, October.
- Michael Waldman, 1984.
"Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer.
- Joseph G. Altonji & Charles R. Pierret, 1997.
"Employer learning and statistical discrimination,"
Working Paper Series, Macroeconomic Issues
WP-97-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Joseph G. Altonji & Charles R. Pierret, . "Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination," IPR working papers 97-18, Institute for Policy Resarch at Northwestern University.
- Joseph G. Altonji & Charles R. Pierret, 1997. "Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination," NBER Working Papers 6279, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- DeVaro, Jed & Waldman, Michael, 2006.
"The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence,"
1550, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012. "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91 - 147.
- Christian Belzil & Michael Bognanno, 2004.
"The Promotion Dynamics of American Executives,"
CIRANO Working Papers
- Belzil, Christian & Bognanno, Michael L., 2004. "The Promotion Dynamics of American Executives," IZA Discussion Papers 1003, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Christian Belzil & Michael Bognanno, 2004. "The Promotion Dynamics of American Executives," Working Papers 0404, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
- Christian Belzil & Michael Bognanno, 2004. "The Promotion Dynamics of American Executives," Post-Print halshs-00180126, HAL.
- Uta Schönberg, 2007.
"Testing for Asymmetric Employer Learning,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 651-691.
- Schönberg, U., 2007. "Testing for asymmetric employer learning," Open Access publications from University College London http://discovery.ucl.ac.u, University College London.
- Pablo Acosta, 2004. "Promotions, State Dependence and Intrafirm Job Mobility: Evidence From Personnel Records," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 585, Econometric Society.
- Francine D. Blau & Jed DeVaro, 2006.
"New Evidence on Gender Difference in Promotion Rates: An Empirical Analysis of a Sample of New Hires,"
NBER Working Papers
12321, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Francine Blau & Jed DeVaro, 2006. "New Evidence on Gender Differences in Promotion Rates: An Empirical Analysis of a Sample of New Hires," Working Papers 891, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- McCue, Kristin, 1996. "Promotions and Wage Growth," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(2), pages 175-209, April.
- Booth, Alison L. & Francesconi, Marco & Frank, Jeff, 2003. "A sticky floors model of promotion, pay, and gender," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 295-322, April.
- Prendergast, Canice, 1992. "Career development and specific human capital collection," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 207-227, September.
- Bernhardt, Dan, 1995. "Strategic Promotion and Compensation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 315-39, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kimiaki Shirahama).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.