Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Cultural And Risk-Related Determinants Of Gender Differences In Ultimatum Bargaining

Contents:

Author Info

  • Ainhoa Jaramillo Gutiérrez

    ()
    (Universitat Jaume I)

  • Nikolaos Georgantzis

    ()
    (Universitat Jaume I)

  • Aurora García Gallego

    ()
    (Universitat Jaume I)

  • Miguel Ginés Vilar

    ()
    (Universitat Jaume I)

Abstract

We study culture and risk aversion as causes of gender differences in ultimatum bargaining. It has often been conjectured in the literature that gender differences in bargaining experiments are partly due to differences in risky decision making. Using the data obtained from our experimental sessions with Spanish subjects, we are able to disentangle risk-related and genuinely gender-specific effects in ultimatum games framed as salary negotiation between an employer and an employee. First, we confirm the broadly accepted result that women are more risk averse than men. Gender differences in both employer and employee-subjects' behavior remain significant after risk attitudes are accounted for. In fact, we show that the reported gender differences are not because of but rather despite females' higher risk aversion. Gender effects are found to depend also on cultural differences. Greek and Spanish females reject more and offer lower wages than males. British subjects exhibit gender effects only with respect to employee behavior, but the sign of the effect is opposite to that observed in the case of Greece and Spain.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2007-08.pdf
File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2007
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 2007-08.

as in new window
Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2007-08

Contact details of provider:
Postal: C/ Guardia Civil, 22, Esc 2a, 1o, E-46020 VALENCIA
Phone: +34 96 319 00 50
Fax: +34 96 319 00 55
Email:
Web page: http://www.ivie.es/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Ultimatum bargaining; salaries; gender; risk attitudes; experiments;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Ortmann, Andreas & Tichy, Lisa K., 1999. "Gender differences in the laboratory: evidence from prisoner's dilemma games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 327-339, July.
  2. Andreoni,J. & Vesterlund,L., 1998. "Which is the fair sex? : Gender differences in altruism," Working papers 10, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  3. Uri Gneezy & Muriel Niederle & Aldo Rustichini, 2003. "Performance In Competitive Environments: Gender Differences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(3), pages 1049-1074, August.
  4. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
  5. Bram Cadsby, C. & Maynes, Elizabeth, 1998. "Gender and free riding in a threshold public goods game: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 603-620, March.
  6. Martin Kocher & Ronald Bosman & Matthias Sutter & Frans van Winden, 2004. "Experimental Evidence Of The Importance Of Gender Pairing In Bargaining," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 78, Royal Economic Society.
  7. Stephanie Seguino & Thomas Stevens & Mark Lutz, 1996. "Gender and cooperative behavior: economic man rides alone," Feminist Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(1), pages 1-21.
  8. Swee Hoon Chuah & Robert Hoffmann & Martin Jones & Geoffrey Williams, 2005. "An Economic Anatomy of Culture: Attitudes and Behaviour in Inter- and Intra- National Ultimatum Game Experiments," Occasional Papers 13, Industrial Economics Division.
  9. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications," IEW - Working Papers 075, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  10. Powell, Melanie & Ansic, David, 1997. "Gender differences in risk behaviour in financial decision-making: An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 605-628, November.
  11. Hessel Oosterbeek & Randolph Sloof & Gijs van de Kuilen, 2004. "Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 171-188, 06.
  12. Gad Saad & Tripat Gill, 2001. "Sex Differences in the Ultimatum Game: An Evolutionary Psychology Perspective," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 171-193, May.
  13. Bolton, Gary E. & Katok, Elena, 1995. "An experimental test for gender differences in beneficent behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(3-4), pages 287-292, June.
  14. Renate Schubert, 1999. "Financial Decision-Making: Are Women Really More Risk-Averse?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 381-385, May.
  15. Sabater-Grande, Gerardo & Georgantzis, Nikolaos, 2002. "Accounting for risk aversion in repeated prisoners' dilemma games: an experimental test," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 37-50, May.
  16. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 2008. "Differences in the Economic Decisions of Men and Women: Experimental Evidence," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier.
  17. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  18. Thaler, Richard H, 1988. "The Ultimatum Game," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 195-206, Fall.
  19. Nowell, Clifford & Tinkler, Sarah, 1994. "The influence of gender on the provision of a public good," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 25-36, September.
  20. Brown-Kruse, Jamie & Hummels, David, 1993. "Gender effects in laboratory public goods contribution : Do individuals put their money where their mouth is?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 255-267, December.
  21. Solnick, Sara J, 2001. "Gender Differences in the Ultimatum Game," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(2), pages 189-200, April.
  22. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 1996. "The relative price of fairness: gender differences in a punishment game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 143-158, August.
  23. Eckel, Catherine C & Grossman, Philip J, 1998. "Are Women Less Selfish Than Men? Evidence from Dictator Experiments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 726-35, May.
  24. Eckel, Catherine C & Grossman, Philip J, 2001. "Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum Games," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(2), pages 171-88, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2007-08. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Departamento de Edición).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.