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Gender Differences in Experimental Wage Negotiations

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  • Marcus Dittrich
  • Andreas Knabe
  • Kristina Leipold

Abstract

We examine behavioral gender differences and gender pairing effects in a laboratory experiment with face-to-face alternating-offers wage bargaining. Our results suggest that male players are able to obtain better bargaining outcomes than female players. Male employees get higher wages than female employees. Male employers pay lower wages to female employees than female employers pay to male employees. Moreover, we find gender differences in the first offers of the bargaining game.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2012/wp-cesifo-2012-06/cesifo1_wp3862.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3862.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3862

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Keywords: gender differences; wage bargaining; labor market experiment;

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References

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  1. Uri Gneezy & Kenneth L. Leonard & John A. List, 2009. "Gender Differences in Competition: Evidence From a Matrilineal and a Patriarchal Society," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 77(5), pages 1637-1664, 09.
  2. Matthias Sutter & Ronald Bosman & Martin Kocher & Frans Winden, 2009. "Gender pairing and bargaining—Beware the same sex!," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 318-331, September.
  3. Eckel, Catherine C & Grossman, Philip J, 2001. "Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum Games," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(2), pages 171-88, April.
  4. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 1996. "The relative price of fairness: gender differences in a punishment game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 143-158, August.
  5. Marcus Dittrich & Andreas Knabe & Kristina Leipold, 2011. "Spillover Effects of Minimum Wages: Theory and Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 3576, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Hå Holm & Peter Engseld, 2005. "Choosing Bargaining Partners—An Experimental Study on the Impact of Information About Income, Status and Gender," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 183-216, September.
  7. Werner Güth & Carsten Schmidt & Matthias Sutter, 2007. "Bargaining outside the lab - a newspaper experiment of a three-person ultimatum game," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(518), pages 449-469, 03.
  8. García-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzís, Nikolaos & Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, Ainhoa, 2012. "Gender differences in ultimatum games: Despite rather than due to risk attitudes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 42-49.
  9. Jeffrey Carpenter & Eric Verhoogen & Stephen Burks, 2003. "The Effect of Stakes in Distribution Experiments," Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics 03-28, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  10. Avner Ben-Ner & Famin Kong & Louis Putterman, . "Share and Share Alike? Intelligence, Socialization, Personality, and Gender-Pairing as Determinants of Giving," Working Papers, Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus) 1002, Human Resources and Labor Studies, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus).
  11. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 2008. "Differences in the Economic Decisions of Men and Women: Experimental Evidence," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier, Elsevier.
  12. Selten, Reinhard & Ockenfels, Axel, 1998. "An experimental solidarity game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 517-539, March.
  13. Eckel, Catherine C & Grossman, Philip J, 1998. "Are Women Less Selfish Than Men? Evidence from Dictator Experiments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 726-35, May.
  14. Ayres, Ian & Siegelman, Peter, 1995. "Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 304-21, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Marcus Dittrich & Kristina Leipold, 2014. "Gender Differences in Strategic Reasoning," CESifo Working Paper Series 4763, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Dittrich, Marcus & Leipold, Kristina, 2014. "Gender differences in time preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 413-415.

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