AbstractConsider two types of residents, who prefer two different values of a policy. A current majority in some city, seeking to increase the probability that it will set policy in the following period, may adopt current policies that are particularly unattractive to the minority, leading some members of the minority to emigrate. Such behavior can lead to extremist policies, to wasteful taxes, and to similar inefficiencies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 050620.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2006
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-07-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-GEO-2006-07-21 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-MAC-2006-07-21 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2006-07-21 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-URE-2006-07-21 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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