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Inter-jurisdictional migration and the size of government

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  • Giuranno, Michele G.
  • Rongili, Biswas

Abstract

This paper develops a model of centralized public spending where decision-makers are the regional median voters instead of the national median voter of the received literature. Regional representatives decide the level of public spending by bargaining in the central legislature. We study how exogenous changes in the composition of the regional electorate either deteriorate or mitigate inter-jurisdictional redistributive conflicts and how these, in turn, influence the size of the government. We find the conditions under which migration-induced inter-regional income convergence (divergence) leads either to a bigger or a smaller government. Finally, the relationship between migration and efficiency is explored within the present framework.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 42604.

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Date of creation: 29 Oct 2012
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:42604

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Keywords: Demographic Changes; Government Spending; Inequality; Redistribution; Bargaining; Political Economy Theory;

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