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"Efficient Policy Choice in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis'' Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Timothy Besley
Stephen Coate
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Paper provided by University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences in its series CARESS Working Papres with number
95-10.
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990.
"Voting on the Budget Deficit ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 37-49, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1988.
"Voting on the Budget Deficit ,"
NBER Working Papers
2759, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Alesina, Alberto F & Tabellini, Guido, 1988.
"Voting on the Budget Deficit ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
269, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Guido Tabellini & Alberto Alesina, 1988.
"Voting on the Budget Deficit ,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
539, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Kenneth Rogoff, 1990.
"Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles ,"
NBER Working Papers
2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996.
"A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1993.
"Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 27-42, March.
Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981.
"A Rational Theory of the Size of Government ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Glazer, Amihai, 1989.
"Politics and the Choice of Durability ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1207-13, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dixit, Avinash K & Londregan, John, 1994.
"Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1056, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gary S. Becker, 1984.
"Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs ,"
University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State
35, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
Other versions: Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria & Spolaore, Enrico, 1994.
"How cynical can an incumbent be? Strategic policy in a model of government spending ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 121-140, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995.
"On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-35, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, .
""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy'' ,"
CARESS Working Papres
95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, .
"An Economic Model of Representative Democracy ,"
Penn CARESS Working Papers
ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
[Downloadable!] Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997.
"An Economic Model of Representative Democracy ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
Wittman, Donald, 1989.
"Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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