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Proper consistency

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  • Asheim,G.B.

    (University of Oslo, Department of Economics)

Abstract

Proper consistency is defined by the properties that each player takes all opponent strategies into account (is cautious) and deems one opponent strategy to be infinitely more likely than another if the opponent prefers the one to the other (respects preferences). When there is common certain belief of proper consistency, a most preferred strategy is properly rationalizable. Any strategy used with positive probability in a proper equilibrium is properly rationalizable. Only strategies that lead to the backward induction outcome is properly rationalizable in the strategic form of a generic perfect information game. Proper rationalizability can be used to test the robustness of inductive procedures.

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File URL: http://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/1999/Memo-31-1999.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 31/1999.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:1999_031

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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
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Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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References

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  1. Epstein, Larry G., 1997. "Preference, Rationalizability and Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-29, March.
  2. Vincent J. Vannetelbosch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 1999. "Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 53-68.
  3. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics 30/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  4. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 61-79, January.
  5. T. Börgers, 2010. "Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge," Levine's Working Paper Archive 378, David K. Levine.
  6. Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J., 1991. "extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research 9130, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  7. Epstein, Larry G & Wang, Tan, 1996. ""Beliefs about Beliefs" without Probabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1343-73, November.
  8. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1991. "Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 909-24, July.
  9. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 243-267, December.
  10. Asheim,G.B. & Dufwenberg,M., 2000. "Admissibility and common belief," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics 07/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  11. Stalnaker, Robert, 1998. "Belief revision in games: forward and backward induction1," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 31-56, July.
  12. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
  13. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 81-98, January.
  14. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February.
  15. Battigalli, P. & Siniscalchi, M., 1999. "Interactive Beliefs and Forward Induction," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute eco99/15, European University Institute.
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Cited by:
  1. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics 30/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  2. Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2000. "Amissibility and Common Belief," Research Papers in Economics, Stockholm University, Department of Economics 2000:6, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.

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