Interactive Beliefs and Forward Induction
AbstractThe authors provide an epistemic analysis of forward induction in games with complete and incomplete information. They suggest that forward induction may be usefully interpreted as a set of assumptions governing the players' belief revision processes, and define a notion of strong belief to formalize these assumptions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics Department, Princeton University in its series Princeton Economic Theory Papers with number 99f3.
Date of creation: Apr 1999
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- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
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- Asheim, Geir & Søvik, Ylva, 2003. "The semantics of preference-based belief operators," Memorandum 05/2003, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003.
"Admissibility and common belief,"
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Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 208-234, February.
- Asheim,G.B., 1999.
31/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Geir B. Asheim, 2000. "Proper Consistency," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0193, Econometric Society.
- Asheim,G.B. & Dufwenberg,M., 2000.
"Deductive reasoning in extensive games,"
08/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Asheim, Geir B. & Sovik, Ylva, 2005. "Preference-based belief operators," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 61-82, July.
- Asheim,G.B., 2000. "Deriving belief operators from preferences," Memorandum 25/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
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