The Global Warming Game - Simulations of a CO2 Reduction Agreement
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 13/1992.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
More information through EDIRC
air pollution ; international cooperation ; economic equilibrium;
Other versions of this item:
- Fankhauser, Samuel & Kverndokk, Snorre, 1996. "The global warming game -- Simulations of a CO2-reduction agreement," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 83-102, March.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Gjerde, Jon & Grepperud, Sverre & Kverndokk, Snorre, 1999.
"Optimal climate policy under the possibility of a catastrophe,"
Resource and Energy Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 21(3-4), pages 289-317, August.
- Jon Gjerde & Sverre Grepperud & Snorre Kverndokk, 1998. "Optimal Climate Policy under the Possibility of a Catastrophe," Discussion Papers 209, Research Department of Statistics Norway.
- Carlos Ciscar, Juan & Soria, Antonio, 2000. "Economic convergence and climate policy," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(11), pages 749-761, September.
- Finus, Michael & Tjotta, Sigve, 2003. "The Oslo Protocol on sulfur reduction: the great leap forward?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2031-2048, September.
- Houda Haffoudhi, 2005. "Political-support lobbies responses to international environmental agreements," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques j05053, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Alfred Endres & Michael Finus, 2002. "Quotas May Beat Taxes in a Global Emission Game," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(6), pages 687-707, November.
- Houda Haffoudhi, 2005. "Political-support lobbies responses to international environmental agreements," Post-Print halshs-00195593, HAL.
- Petrakis, Emmanuel & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 1996. "Environmental consciousness and moral hazard in international agreements to protect the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 95-110, April.
- Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 1998. "Renegotiation–Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(3), pages 275-306, October.
- Maryse Labriet & Richard Loulou, 2008. "How Crucial is Cooperation in Mitigating World Climate? Analysis with World-MARKAL," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 67-94, February.
- Anastasios Xepapadeas, 1998. "Policy Adoption Rules and Global Warming," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 635-646, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rhiana Bergh-Seeley).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.