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Endogenous Institutional Change After Independence

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Author Info
Congdon Fors, Heather () (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University)
Olsson, Ola () (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University)

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Abstract

A key event in economic history was the independence of nearly ninety former colonies after World War II. On the basis of qualitative and quantitative evidence, we argue that independence often constituted an institutional disequilibrium that the new regimes reacted to in very different ways. We present a model of endogenous changes in property rights institutions where an autocratic post-colonial ruler faces a basic trade-off between stronger property rights, which increases his dividends from the modern sector, and weaker property rights that increases his ability to appropriate resource rents. The model predicts that revenuemaximizing regimes in control of an abundance of resource rents and with insignificant interests in the modern sector will rationally install weak institutions of private property, a prediction which we argue is well in line with actual developments in for instance DR Congo, Ghana, and Zambia.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/2759
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Göteborg University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 163.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 22 Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0163

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Postal: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
Phone: 031-773 10 00
Web page: http://www.handels.gu.se/econ/
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Related research
Keywords: institutions; property rights; independence; resource rents; rent seeking;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
O57 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Comparative Studies of Countries
P14 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Property Rights

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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Hansson, Gustav & Olsson, Ola, 2006. "Country Size and the Rule of Law: Resuscitating Montesquieu," Working Papers in Economics 200, Göteborg University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Olsson, Ola, 2004. "Diamonds Are a Rebel’s Best Friend," Working Papers in Economics 156, Göteborg University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
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