AbstractThe author studies the persistence of inequality and inefficient governance in a physical capital accumulation model with perfect information, missing credit markets, and endogenous barriers to entry. When access to investment opportunities is regulated, rent-seeking entrepreneurs form coalitions of potentially varying size to bribe a regulator to restrict entry. Small coalitions run short of resources, while large coalitions suffer more severe free-rider problems. The distribution of wealth thus determines the equilibrium coalition structure of the economy and consequently the level of regulatory capture. A dynamic analysis supports the persistence of inefficiencies in the long run. Initial conditions determine whether the economy converges to a steady state characterized by efficient governance and low levels of inequality, or a path toward an institutional trap where regulatory capture and wealth inequality reinforce each other.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3291.
Date of creation: 01 Apr 2004
Date of revision:
Roads&Highways; Information Technology; Health Monitoring&Evaluation; Gender and Health; Early Child and Children's Health;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-08-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2004-08-16 (Development)
- NEP-ENT-2004-09-12 (Entrepreneurship)
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