Using a longitudinal data for about 1800 persons observed between 1986 and 1991, this study investigates the incentive effects on short-term sickness spells of two important regime changes in the social insurance system in Sweden implemented in 1987 and 1991. The results indicate that the rules influenced people’s decisions about when to report the beginning and ending of sickness spells. The 1991 reform, which reduced the replacement rate, had a stronger effect on reducing the duration of short-term absences than the 1987 reform, which restricted the payment of sickness cash benefit to only scheduled workdays.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Göteborg University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number
136.
Length: 25 pages Date of creation: 28 Jun 2004 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0136
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden Phone: 031-773 10 00 Web page: http://www.handels.gu.se/econ/ More information through EDIRC
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