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Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance: Why (not)?

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  • Larsson, Laura

    (IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation)

Abstract

The paper discusses harmonization of unemployment insurance (UI) and sickness insurance (SI). The focus is on the difference between the benefit ceilings in the two insurance systems that has been shown to affect the behavior among unemployed SI recipients. The four conclusions are: (i) It is difficult to argue that the design with different benefit ceilings of UI and SI would be optimal. (ii) During the study period 1998–2001, unemployed were overrepresented among SI recipients. (iii) Some of the overrepresentation is due to the different benefit ceilings. Thus, harmonization of the systems is motivated; (iv) In a complex system as the Swedish social insurance system, reducing moral hazard in one group probably also implies various indirect effects. When designing a reform, all insurances should be considered simultaneously.

Suggested Citation

  • Larsson, Laura, 2004. "Harmonizing unemployment and sickness insurance: Why (not)?," Working Paper Series 2004:8, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2004_008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Johansson, Per & Skedinger, Per, 2005. "Are Objective, Official Measures of Disability Reliable?," Working Paper Series 643, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    2. Per Engström & Bertil Holmlund, 2007. "Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(3), pages 439-467, September.
    3. Martin Söderström & Roope Uusitalo, 2010. "School Choice and Segregation: Evidence from an Admission Reform," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 112(1), pages 55-76, March.
    4. Caroline Hall, 2011. "Do Interactions between Unemployment Insurance and Sickness Insurance Affect Transitions to Employment?," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 25(4), pages 447-467, December.
    5. International Monetary Fund, 2004. "Sweden: Selected Issues," IMF Staff Country Reports 2004/245, International Monetary Fund.
    6. van den Berg, Gerard J & Lindeboom, Maarten & Dolton, Peter J, 2004. "Survey non-response and unemployment duration," Working Paper Series 2004:12, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    7. Caroline Hall & Laura Hartman, 2010. "Moral hazard among the sick and unemployed: evidence from a Swedish social insurance reform," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 27-50, August.
    8. Holmlund, Bertil, 2004. "Sickness Absence and Search Unemployment," Working Paper Series 2004:6, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    9. Andersen, Torben M. & Haagen Pedersen, Lars, 2008. "Distribution and labour market incentives in the welfare state – Danish experiences," Working Paper Series 2008:10, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    10. Cantoni, Eva & de Luna, Xavier, 2004. "Non-parametric adjustment for covariates when estimating a treatment effect," Working Paper Series 2004:9, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Government policies; moral hazard; sickness insurance; unemployment insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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