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Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium

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  • Engström, Per

    (Uppsala University)

  • Holmlund, Bertil

    (Uppsala University)

Abstract

The paper presents a general equilibrium model of search unemployment that incorporates absence from work as a distinct labor force state. Absenteeism is driven by random shocks to the value of leisure that are private information to the workers. Firms maximize profits while recognizing that the compensation package may affect the queue of job applicants and the absence rate. The analysis provides results concerning the effects of social insurance benefits and other determinants of workers’ and firms’ behavior. The normative anlysis identifies externalities associated with firm-provided sick pay and examines the welfare implications of alternative policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Engström, Per & Holmlund, Bertil, 2007. "Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium," IZA Discussion Papers 2947, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2947
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hesselius, Patrik, 2003. "Does Sick Absence Increase the Risk of Unemployment?," Working Paper Series 2003:15, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Per Engstrom & Bertil Holmlund, 2009. "Tax evasion and self-employment in a high-tax country: evidence from Sweden," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(19), pages 2419-2430.
    2. Nilsson, Martin, 2015. "Economic incentives and long-term sickness absence: the indirect effect of replacement rates on absence behavior," Working Paper Series 2015:17, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    3. Chen, Jie, 2006. "The Dynamics of Housing Allowance Claims in Sweden: A discrete-time hazard analysis," Working Paper Series 2006:1, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    4. Laszlo Goerke, 2017. "Sick pay reforms and health status in a unionised labour market," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 64(2), pages 115-142, May.
    5. Heijdra, Ben J. & Ligthart, Jenny E., 2010. "The Transitional Dynamics Of Fiscal Policy In Small Open Economies," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 1-28, February.
    6. repec:dau:papers:123456789/179 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Fredrik Johansson-Tormod & Anders Klevmarken, 2022. "Explaining the Size and Nature of Response in a Survey on Health Status and Economic Standard," International Journal of Microsimulation, International Microsimulation Association, vol. 15(1), pages 63-77.
    8. Caroline Hall, 2011. "Do Interactions between Unemployment Insurance and Sickness Insurance Affect Transitions to Employment?," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 25(4), pages 447-467, December.
    9. Goerke, Laszlo & Pannenberg, Markus, 2015. "Trade union membership and sickness absence: Evidence from a sick pay reform," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 13-25.
    10. Assar Lindbeck & Mats Persson, 2013. "A continuous model of income insurance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(6), pages 938-960, December.
    11. Stephanie Prümer & Claus Schnabel, 2019. "Questioning the Stereotype of the “Malingering Bureaucrat”: Absence from Work in the Public and Private Sector in Germany," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(4), pages 570-603, November.
    12. Daniel S. J. Lechmann & Claus Schnabel, 2014. "Absence from Work of the Self-Employed: A Comparison with Paid Employees," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 368-390, August.
    13. Masaru Sasaki, 2010. "Unemployment and Workplace Safety in a Search and Matching Model," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 10-14, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    14. Konstantinos, Pouliakas & Ioannis, Theodossiou, 2010. "An Inquiry Into the Theory, Causes and Consequences of Monitoring Indicators of Health and Safety At Work," MPRA Paper 20336, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Pouliakas, Konstantinos & Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos, 2009. "Performance Pay as an Incentive for Lower Absence Rates in Britain," MPRA Paper 18238, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    unemployment; search; absenteeism; social insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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