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Inequality-Seeking Punishment

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Author Info
Daniel Houser () (Interdsciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University)
Erte Xiao (Department of Social and Decision Science,Carnegie Mellon University)

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Abstract

Inequality aversion is a key motive for punishment, with many prominent studies suggesting people use punishment to reduce or eliminate inequality. Punishment in laboratory games, however, is nearly always designed to promote equality (e.g., rejections in standard ultimatum games) and the marginal cost of punishment is typically non-trivially positive. As a consequence, individual preferences over punishment outcomes remain largely uninformed. We here report data from a laboratory experiment using dictator games. We find that when people are treated unfairly they systematically prefer to use punishment to create advantageous inequality. Our results shed new light on human preferences over punishment outcomes, and have important implications for the design of mechanisms to deter misconduct.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science in its series Working Papers with number 1009.

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Length: 11 pages
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Handle: RePEc:gms:wpaper:1009

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This page was last updated on 2010-2-3.


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