Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice and Entry on the Intermediate Market
AbstractThis paper analyzes the profitability of vertical integration for an upstream monopoly facing a potential competitor. We show that it depends on the technology used by the firm when it integrates. We distinguish two types of technologies : standard technologies used by non-integrated firms, and non-standard technologies, reserved to integrated firms and implying the complete foreclosure of non-integrated firms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1) in its series Papiers d'Economie MathÃ©matique et Applications with number 2000.18.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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TECHNOLOGY ; MONOPOLIES ; COMPETITION;
Other versions of this item:
- Eric Avenel & Corinne Barlet, 2000. "Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(2), pages 211-230, 06.
- Eric Avenel & Corinne Barlet, 2000. "Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 211-230, 06.
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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- Hernán, Roberto & Kujal, Praveen, 2012.
"Vertical integration, market floreclosure and quality investment,"
Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
info:hdl:10016/14968, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Roberto Hernán González & Praveen Kujal, 2012. "Vertical integration, market foreclosure and quality investment," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 1-20, April.
- Roberto Hernan & Praveen Kujal, 2006. "Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure And Quality Investment," Economics Working Papers we061405, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Ramón Faulí-Oller & Joel Sandonís Díez, 2003. "On The Competitive Effects Of Vertical Integration Under Product Differentiation," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-31, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Éric Avenel & Stéphane Caprice, 2012. "Collusion and downstream entry in a vertically integrated industry," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201208, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Inderst, Roman & Valletti, Tommaso, 2011. "Incentives for input foreclosure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(6), pages 820-831, August.
- Lemarie, Stephane & Ramani, Shyama, 2003. "Analysis Of The Vertical Relationships Between Seed And Biotech Companies," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 22041, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Laurent Linnemer, 2000.
"When Backward Integration by a Dominant Firm Improves Welfare,"
2000-42, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Laurent Linnemer, 2002. "When Backward Integration by a Dominant Firm Improves Welfare," CESifo Working Paper Series 740, CESifo Group Munich.
- Michiel Bijlsma & Viktoria Kocsis & Victoria Shestalova & Gijsbert Zwart, 2008. "Vertical foreclosure: a policy framework," CPB Document 157, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Roman Inderst & Tommaso Valletti, 2006. "Market Analysis in the Presence of Indirect Constraints and Captive Sales," CEIS Research Paper 74, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
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