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Breaking the norm: An empirical investigation into the unraveling of good behavior

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  • Hill, Ruth Vargas
  • Maruyama, Eduardo
  • Viceisza, Angelino

Abstract

We present results from an artefactual field experiment conducted in rural Peru that considers how observing nonreciprocal behavior influences an individual's decision to reciprocate. Specifically, we consider the behavior of second movers in a trust game, assessing how their decision to reciprocate is influenced by the observed behavior of others and the extent to which their actions can be observed. In documenting how an external shock to the number observed not to reciprocate influences reciprocation, the paper endeavors to provide some insight into how reciprocity can unravel when individuals are learning behavior in a new market institution.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in its series IFPRI discussion papers with number 948.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Handle: RePEc:fpr:ifprid:948

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Keywords: artefactual field experiment; norms; nonreciprocal behavior; Trust; Markets; Institutions;

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References

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  1. Marcel Fafchamps, 2004. "Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262062364.
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Cited by:
  1. Torero, Maximo & Viceisza, Angelino, 2011. "Potential collusion and trust: Evidence from a field experiment in Vietnam," IFPRI discussion papers 1100, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  2. Charness, Gary & Viceisza, Angelino, 2012. "Comprehension and Risk Elicitation in the Field: Evidence from Rural Senegal," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt5512d150, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.

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