This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Tax policy design in the presence of social preferences: some experimental evidence

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Lucy F. Ackert
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Mark Rider

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper reports the results of experiments designed to examine whether a taste for fairness affects people’s preferred tax structure. Building on the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model, we devise a simple test for the presence of social preferences in voting for alternative tax structures. The experimental results show that individuals demonstrate concern for their own payoff and inequality aversion in choosing among alternative tax structures. However, concern for redistribution decreases when it leads to increasing deadweight losses. Our findings have important implications for the design of optimal tax theory.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/wp0433.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in its series Working Paper with number 2004-33.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedawp:2004-33

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1000 Peachtree St., N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30309
Phone: 404-521-8500
Email:
Web page: http://www.frbatlanta.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Diane Rosenberger).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Hoffman Elizabeth & McCabe Kevin & Shachat Keith & Smith Vernon, 1994. "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 346-380, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Carlsson , Fredrik & Gupta, Gautam & Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2002. "Choosing from Behind a Veil of Ignorance in India," Working Papers in Economics 72, Göteborg University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Camerer, Colin, . "Progress and Behavioral Game Theory," Working Papers 1004, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  5. Guth, Werner & Tietz, Reinhard, 1990. "Ultimatum bargaining behavior : A survey and comparison of experimental results," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 417-449, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bagnoli, Mark & McKee, Michael, 1991. "Voluntary Contribution Games: Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(2), pages 351-66, April.
  7. Hettich, Walter & Winer, Stanley L, 1988. "Economic and Political Foundations of Tax Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 701-12, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1042, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Norman Gemmell & Oliver Morrissey & Abuzer Pinar, 2004. "Tax perceptions and preferences over tax structure in the united kingdom," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(493), pages F117-F138, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Peter A. Diamond & J. A. Mirrlees, 1968. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production," Working papers 22, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  11. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. McFadden, Daniel L., 1984. "Econometric analysis of qualitative response models," Handbook of Econometrics, in: Z. Griliches† & M. D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 1395-1457 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 309. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Alice M. Isen, 2000. "The Effect of Affect on Economic and Strategic Decision Making," Method and Hist of Econ Thought 9912001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers iewwp004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard, 1986. "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 728-41, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Camerer, Colin F, 1997. "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 167-88, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Lucy F. Ackert & Bryan K. Church & Richard Deaves, 2003. "Emotion and financial markets," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q2, pages 33-41. [Downloadable!]
  21. Olof Johansson-Stenman & Fredrik Carlsson & Dinky Daruvala, 2002. "Measuring Future Grandparents" Preferences for Equality and Relative Standing," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(479), pages 362-383, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Hörisch, Hannah, 2007. "Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment," Discussion Papers in Economics 1362, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark Rider & Lucy F. Ackert & Ann Gillette, 2005. "Experimental Evidence for Tax Policy Design," International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0517, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Hannah Hörisch, 2008. "Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment," Discussion Papers 230, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS uses the data collected within the RePEc project, the largest online bibliographic database in Economics.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.