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Spectators Versus Stakeholders with/without Information: the Difference it Makes for Justice

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Author Info

  • Leonardo Becchetti

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata")

  • Giacomo Degli Antoni

    ()
    (University of Milano - Bicocca)

  • Stefania Ottone

    ()
    (University of Milano - Bicocca)

  • Nazaria Solferino

    ()
    (University of Calabria)

Abstract

We document that being spectators (no effect on personal payoffs) and, to a lesser extent, stakeholders without information on relative payoffs, induces subjects who can choose distribution criteria after task performance to prefer rewarding talent (vis à vis effort, chance or strict egalitarianism) after guaranteeing a minimal egalitarian base. Information about distribution of payoffs under different criteria reduces dramatically such choice since most players opt or revise their decision in favor of the criterion which maximizes their own payoff (and, by doing so, end up being farther from the maximin choice). Large part (but not all) of the stakeholders’ choices before knowing the payoff distribution are driven by their performance beliefs since two thirds of them choose the criterion in which they assume to perform and earn relatively better.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tor Vergata University, CEIS in its series CEIS Research Paper with number 221.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 20 Feb 2012
Date of revision: 20 Feb 2012
Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:221

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Postal: CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma
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Related research

Keywords: Distributive Justice; Perceived Fairness; Meritocracy; Talent; Chance; Effort;

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  11. Binmore, Ken, 2005. "Natural Justice," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780195178111, October.
  12. Theo Offerman & Joep Sonnemans & Gijs Van De Kuilen & Peter P. Wakker, 2009. "A Truth Serum for Non-Bayesians: Correcting Proper Scoring Rules for Risk Attitudes ," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(4), pages 1461-1489.
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