Choosing from Behind a Veil of Ignorance in India
AbstractSocial inequality aversion is measured through a veil-of-ignorance experiment with Indian students. The median relative risk aversion is found to be quite high, about 3, and independent caste.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 72.
Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: 07 Jun 2002
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Applied Economics Letters, 2003, pages 825-827.
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Postal: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
Phone: 031-773 10 00
Web page: http://www.handels.gu.se/econ/
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Veil of ignorance; inequality aversion; risk aversion; caste;
Other versions of this item:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-06-13 (All new papers)
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