Chance versus choice: eliciting attitudes to fair compensations
AbstractThis paper reports an experiment designed to elicit social preferences over income compensation schemes, where income differences between subjects have two independent components: one due to chosen effort and the other due to random chance. These differences can be compensated through social dividends, according to principles chosen beforehand by subjects themselves from behind a stylised Rawlsian veil of ignorance, or outside the society on which the principles will be implemented. We test the attractiveness in particular of Luck Egalitarianism, compensating inequalities due to chance but not those due to choice. We find modest but not overwhelming support for these principles, suggesting that subjectsâ€™actual preferences are more complex.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of York in its series Discussion Papers with number 13/15.
Date of creation: Jul 2013
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, United Kingdom
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chance; choice; envy-freeness; fairness; luck; luck egalitarianism; responsibility;
Other versions of this item:
- John Bone & Paolo Crosetto & John D. Hey & Carmen Pasca, 2013. "Change versus choice: eliciting attitudes to fair compensations," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-029, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-07-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2013-07-28 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-DCM-2013-07-28 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-EXP-2013-07-28 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2013-07-28 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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